A large body of evidence suggests that social comparisons matter for workers' valuation of the wage they receive. The consequences of social comparisons in imperfectly competitive labor markets are less well understood. We analyze an oligopsonistic model of the labor market where workers derive (dis-) utility from comparing their own wage with wages paid at other rms. As social comparisons become more prevalent all workers are paid higher wages, the wage distribution becomes more equal, and employment shifts to high productivity rms. Moreover, the total wage bill and output increase, while aggregate prots decline. Overall welfare increases. Our theoretical results have implications for estimating the elasticity of the labor supply curve facing a rm.
Introduction
Thinking about the working of labor markets as a place of imperfect competition is probably ... more natural and less forced, as Manning (2003, p. 11) puts it, than applying the competitive model. Analytical approaches including frictions due to some sort of monopsony power (Robinson, 1933; Bhaskar and To, 1999; Bhaskar et al., 2002) or owing to matching imperfections (Diamond, 1982; Pissarides, 1985; Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) have become important tools for analyzing labor markets. Typically, however, those models build on preferences of workers such that only own wage payments are driving the decision to supply labor. Although there is widespread evidence that workers do not only derive positive utility from their own wages but that also comparisons with coworkers aect well-being, job and wage satisfaction, and behavior at the workplace (see, e.g., Brown et al., 2008; Clark et al., 2009; Card et al., 2012; Godechot and Senik, 2015; Goerke and Pannenberg, 2015) , little is known about the eects of other-regarding preferences in oligopsonistic labor markets.
In this contribution, we consider an oligopsonistic labor market where workers undertake wage comparisons. We analyze the eects of wage comparisons on wages, the wage and functional income distribution, the structure of employment, output, and welfare. Our main ndings are that with social comparisons all workers are paid higher wages than in the absence of such preferences. In addition, the wage distribution becomes more equal, employment at high productivity rms increases and decreases at low productivity rms. Moreover, the aggregate wage bill and output rise, while total prots decline. We nally show that welfare, dened as the sum of rms' prots and workers' utility, increases with more intense social comparisons.
Market power by rms such that they are not facing a completely elastic labor supply leads to wages at which workers are expropriated, an insight already propagated by Pigou (1929) . Our ndings, as outlined above, suggest that social comparisons can partly compensate for the negative consequences arising to workers from the market power of rms. Contrary to monopsony, rms compete to some extent for labor with other rms in oligopsony. The lower labor market frictions are, the more they compete for workers who by assumption have heterogeneous preferences for a given number of employers. What social comparisons add is ercer competition between rms as workers attach lower utility to a rm that pays less than its competitors.
Consequently, the strategic complementarity in the wage setting of rms in an oligopsonistic market is strengthened by workers' preferences being subject to social comparisons. We show this by holding market frictions constant throughout, and analyzing the consequences for labor allocation arising from various degrees of social comparisons. The way we think about the allocation of heterogeneous rms in our model lets wages increase with social comparisons by the same absolute amount for high and low productivity rms so that workers at high productivity rms gain relatively less than workers at low productivity rms. The resulting relative wage compression explains the ndings regarding the structure of employment and the functional income distribution. While overall employment does not change, since this is given in our model, low productivity rms will employ fewer workers and high productivity rms more workers as social comparisons becomes more prevalent.
A direct upshot is that overall output increases from which workers benet disproportionately, so that total prots decline at the expense of a higher wage sum. Moreover, welfare increases.
Our results that social comparisons lead to ercer competition for labor between rms in oligopsony has implications for the estimation of labor supply elasticities to the rm. Such work has been pioneered by Nelson (1973) and Sullivan (1989) , and has become center stage for empirically determining whether and to which extent there is imperfect competition in the labor market. Our theoretical ndings suggest that when workers derive utility from comparing their own wage with wages paid at other rms, the inverse labor supply curve to an individual rm becomes atter. Therefore, not taking into account social comparisons may understate the actual degree of frictions in the labor market, i.e. part of the variation in the elasticity of the labor supply curve to an individual rm may be explained by social comparisons rather than frictions.
Economists have realized for a long time that relative concerns matter for economic behavior. Already Adam Smith dened consumption goods in relative terms in the Wealth of Nations when he wrote that necessaries are ...not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. (Smith, 1776, Book V, Ch. II, Part 2). Veblen (2003, ch. 2: Pecuniary emulation, p. 24) noted in 1899 that Relative success, tested by an invidious pecuniary comparison with other men, becomes the conventional end of action. Similarly Pigou (1903, p. 60 ) discusses social preferences, and concerns for relative pay have been put forward by Keynes (1936, ch. 2) as a potential cause for wage stickiness. More recently, the labor supply eects of social comparisons have been analyzed in a variety of settings. One of the main analytical predictions resulting from these contributions is that if individuals exhibit jealousy or envy (in the sense of Dupor and Liu 2003) , labor supply will be excessive with consequences for growth (Liu and Turnovsky, 2005) , taxation (Persson, 1995; Ireland, 2001; Corneo, 2002; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2014, 2015) , provision of public goods (Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Wendner and Goulder, 2008) , and the impact of multiple or dierent types of social concerns (Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2013; Mujcic and Frijters, 2015) . This is the case because individuals do not take into account that an expansion of labor supply which raises their own income reduces relative income of others, thus making them worse o and enticing them to expand their income generating activities. Frank (1984) and Schor (1991) , e.g., provide a detailed illustration.
Theoretically, the consequences of social comparisons with respect to labor supply have generally been looked at in the context of competitive markets. A prominent contribution is Dufwenberg et al. (2011) who describe conditions under which social preferences do not aect market allocations.
However, there are some exceptions, that is, analyses of social preferences in the context of imperfectly competitive markets. Desiraju et al. (2007) and von Siemens (2010) study the impact of social comparisons in a monopsony. They are interested in workers' sorting behavior into particular jobs, and rms' prots when workers have private information on their ability or social preferences. In von Siemens (2012) it is then shown that social comparisons have an eect on market outcomes even when competition in increased. Goerke and Hillesheim (2013) assume rm-specic trade unions which represent individuals with preferences exhibiting concerns for social comparisons.
Since trade unions raise wages above the marketclearing level, labor demand and actual hours of work decline. Hence, unions can internalize the impact of social comparisons. Furthermore, Mauleon et al. (2014) show that trade unions which bargain over wages with a rm selling its product in an oligopolistic market will achieve higher wage outcomes if the strength of wage comparisons become more pronounced. Higher wages, in turn, reduce employment, output and prots. In addition, and taking up an approach proposed by Oswald (1979) , there are a number of contributions in which the utility of a specic trade union is negatively aected by the wage bargained by other unions. These investigations generally focus on the impact of such union rivalry on wages, employment and other macroeconomic outcomes (cf. Gylfason and Lindbeck, 1984; Dixon, 1988; Strøm, 1995; De la Croix et al., 1994 ), but do not analyze how two types of market imperfections interact.
1 Finally, expanding on the notion of fair wages (c.f. Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) , the consequences of social comparisons on eort choices and the wage setting behavior of rms have been analyzed in an eciency wage context (Charness and Kuhn, 2007) . However, the interaction of rms on the labor market has not played a role.
Empirically, only a few previous papers have examined the role of relative income on labor supply, using data for the United States. For example, Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) show that women's decision to supply labor depends on their sisters' employment decision and Park (2010) nds that relative income of husbands plays an important role in the labor supply decisions of married women. Pérez-Asenjo (2011) demonstrates that the probability of working full-time instead of part-time, of labor force partic-1 Woo (2011; 2016) introduces status eects with respect to consumption goods into models of imperfect product market competition. The prediction of over-consumption obtained for competitive settings may no longer arise in oligopoly or if there is monopolistic competition. Guo (2005) obtains a similar nding in that the tax rate inducing rst-best consumption may not be positive on account of the product market imperfection.
ipation, and working hours decline with relative income. Finally, Bracha et al. (2015) present empirical evidence for students that information about relative pay tends to reduce labor supply of those male subjects paid a lower wage.
In sum, the labor market distortions due to (a) social comparisons and (b) rms having market power on the labor market have been considered intensively, but separately. In the present contribution, we focus on the interaction of these two, well-established deviations from the benchmark model of perfect competition. We proceed by setting up our model in Section 2, present the results in Section 3, and conclude in Section 4.
Model

General set-up
Our theoretical framework is an oligopsonistic labor market in which workers do not only derive utility from their own wage but also from comparing themselves with other workers. In particular, we consider a model where rms are price takers on the output market but have market power on the labor market. The rms' labor supply schedule is imperfectly elastic because jobs have dierent non-wage characteristics. When workers decide for which rm to work they do not only take into account the wages and non-wage characteristics but also how the wage they would get at a particular rm compares to wages of other workers.
More specically, we follow Bhaskar and To (1999; and assume that workers with mass one and of equal ability but with dierent preferences regarding job characteristics are distributed uniformly on a circle of unit circumference as in Salop (1979) . The circle is populated with an even number of n rms, with n ≥ 2. The distance to the next rm on each side is 1/n. The distance on the circle between the location of a rm and the position inhabited by any particular worker can be interpreted as the disutility of the job oered by that rm due to its non-wage characteristics.
These non-wage characteristics may relate to physical working conditions, working hours, colleagues, customer relationships, or commuting distance.
They cannot be ranked generally in that all workers prefer one set of characteristics to another. Instead, dierent workers have dierent preferences over these non-wage features of a job, i.e., the model is one of horizontal job dierentiation. Locations for rms and working time per worker are xed.
A worker's utility is linear in the sum of wage income and the utility from social comparisons, to be specied below, and the dis-utility from disadvantageous job characteristics. This dis-utility equals the product tx of the distance from a rm, x, and the costs per unit of distance, denoted by t.
A worker will accept the job oered by a rm if the resulting utility level is positive and higher than the utility from a job oered by another rm. All workers have reservation wages of zero.
We assume that workers compare their wage income to a reference income. Analyses of social comparisons often dier with respect to the composition of the reference group and the nature of social preferences. In the context of our model in which all individuals work, other workers constitute the natural reference group. Moreover, status preferences have usually been incorporated into models of labor supply as depending either on the dierence between wage or income levels (see, inter alia, Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Choudhary and Levine, 2006; Pérez-Asenjo, 2011) or as being a function of their ratio (see, e.g., Persson, 1995; Corneo, 2002; Goerke and Hillesheim, 2013) . We choose the additive comparison approach (c.f. Clark and Oswald, 1998) because it preserves the linear relationship between wages and labor supply characterizing the model without social comparisons.
2 More specifically, if the wage workers receive is greater (less) than the average wage, workers gain (lose) utility. The strength of such comparison eects depends on the absolute dierence of wage levels and is indicated by a parameter γ, γ ≥ 0, where γ = 0 captures the absence of such considerations. Formally, the utility of working at rm i if located at distance x from that rm is given by:
(1)
To generate meaningful wage comparisons and wage and prot distributions, we suppose that there are two types of rms. L-type rms have lower prots than H-type rms when facing the same production costs, for example, because of lower productivity. We, nally, assume that rms of dierent productivities alternate on the circle, such that each L-rm has an H-type rm to the left and right, and vice versa. This substantially simplies the subsequent analysis, without aecting the basic features of the model (c.f. Bhaskar and To, 2003) .
Labor supply to a rm
Denote wages paid at the two rms located next to rm i with w i + and w i − . In order to derive labor supply to a rm i we have to consider workers located between rm i and its neighbor on one side, rm i + , and workers located between i and the neighbor on the other side, that is, rm i − . We focus on a worker who is situated at distance x from rm i and at distance 1/n − x from rm i + . Such a worker will compare the utility from working at rm i or at rm i + . Consequently, the worker will select rm i if
We may re-write the inequality as
to see that, given the symmetric set-up, comparison with average wages at all other rms results in comparing wages of the rms to the two sides of a worker. After canceling terms one gets
All workers closer to rm i than distancẽ
( 5) will work for rm i. All other workers rather prefer to work for rm i + .
Considering also the workers on the other side of rm i, total labor supply to rm i becomes
Labor supply to rm i increases with the absolute dierential between the wage it pays itself and the average wage of its two neighboring rms. Moreover, the slope of the labor supply function to rm i, that is ∂L i /∂w i , is decreasing in t and increasing in the degree of social comparisons γ. This implies that as social comparisons become more prevalent the inverse labor supply curve to an individual rm holding all else constant attens out. The rm acts as if it was placed in a more competitive setting.
The features of the labor supply curve (6) with respect to social comparisons are very general and do not depend on the formulation of preferences as described by equation (1). Alternative specications include preferences (a) as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) who assume that workers also derive disutility when earning a higher wage than the reference group, (b) such that workers compare their wage to some (employment-) weighted average of ref-
erence wages, (c) which attach dierent weights to dierent reference groups, or (d) which ensure that stronger social comparisons reduce the relevance of the own wage (see Appendix). Consequently, the specic characteristics of preferences as captured in equation (1) have no impact on the rms' prot maximizing wage choices derived below.
Prot maximization
As in Bhaskar and To (1999; we consider a production function which is homogeneous degree of one in labor
where K i is capital input to rm i, and f i > 0 and f i < 0. Firm i's prot equation follows as
where p i is the price which rm i charges for its product and r is the capital rental rate. We may reformulate the prot function by using the rst-order condition for the rm's optimal capital usage
and k * i being the optimal capital-labor ratio. φ i is rm i's net revenue product of labor for which the rm optimally adjusted its capital-labor ratio. The rm's net revenue product of labor increases in the capital-labor ratio, k i , and the price, p i , because the production function is strictly concave. Moreover, the optimal capital-labor ratio k * i increases with the price (see (9)).
We model rm dierences by assuming that φ
shown below, H-type and L-type rms will pay dierent wages and have dierent prot levels. Accordingly, the assumption of dierences in the net revenue product of labor generates an income distribution. Net revenue products of two rms which compete against each other in the same labor market may diverge because they produce dierent goods allowing them to
the H-type rm has a higher productivity, possibly due to dierences in managerial talent or production techniques. To formally capture the idea of dierences in the net revenue product of labor we, therefore, assume that
, where a p , a f ≥ 1 and a p + a f > 2. In our subsequent exposition we focus on productivity dierences as the cause of
e. a setting in which a f > 1 = a p holds, and refer to H-type (L-type) rms as high (low) productivity enterprises.
Each rm maximizes prots with respect to its own wage, taking as given the wages paid at other rms. Using labor supply (6) the rst-order condition is given by
As usual in models of oligopsonistic labor markets, the optimal wage results from the trade-o between higher labor costs and greater labor supply. The second-order condition for a maximum is fullled (∂ 2 π i /∂ 2 w i < 0). Rearranging (11) gives the optimal wage a rm i sets as: 3
The optimal wage of a rm i equals the weighted sum of the rm's net revenue product of labor, and the wages paid in neighboring rms, less a measure of the disutility cost t (as in To, 1999, 2003; Kaas, 2009; Hirsch, 2009 ). Own productivity, as captured by φ i (p i , r), has a positive wage eect because the gain in prots from increasing labor input becomes larger the more productive the additional worker is. Moreover, higher unit disutility costs t/n for workers make it less likely that a worker will accept 3 We assume that prots are positive and derive the restriction on the net revenue product of labor, φi(pi, r), which guarantees this feature in the Appendix.
the wage oer by a neighboring rm, because the net gain from doing so, i.e., the dierence between the wage paid by that rm less disutility costs, is reduced. Finally, a higher wage in a neighboring rm lowers labor supply to rm i. To reduce the resulting decline in prots, the wage in rm i is raised.
This strategic complementarity in wage setting has important implications for the eect of social comparisons, because its strength, as measured by the parameter γ, raises the elasticity of labor supply. While disutility costs lower the labor supply elasticity to rms, social comparisons have a counteracting eect on it.
Results
Having derived optimal wage-setting behavior by an arbitrary rm i, we now turn to the implications of social comparisons by workers for wage setting, the distribution of wages, employment, output, the functional income distribution, and welfare. To simplify notation, we subsequently omit the arguments of the net revenue product φ i (p i , r) and denote it by φ H and φ L for the high-and the low productivity rms, respectively.
Wage eects
For equilibrium wages we get the following results. Proposition 1. Equilibrium wages for the high (H) and low (L) productivity rms write:
A higher prevalence of social comparisons increases wages in both types of rms by the same amount.
Proof. When setting wages, the n rms play Nash against each other. From (12) we already know each rms' reaction function. Thus, we have to solve for a system of n equations taking into account that due to the assumption of alternating productivity levels of neighboring rms, a low productivity rm has two high productivity neighbors, and vice versa. After adding up the n/2 reaction functions of the high productivity and of the low productivity rms, the system of n equation essentially boils down to two equations: 4
Solving for w * H and w * L we obtain (13) and (14). The partial derivatives are:
Social comparisons partly compensate for the expropriation of workers that typically arises on non-competitive labor markets where rms can exert market power due to frictions. In our oligopsonistic setting it is the disutility t from disadvantageous job characteristics that reduces workers' wages.
Social comparisons, however, increase equilibrium wages due to the strategic complementarity in the wage setting of rms in oligopsony. Firms are trying to attract workers by oering higher wages than their competing neighbors.
A higher wage set by rm i has a negative externality on its neighboring rms which have to increase their wage oers in order not to fall short of labor supply. The more pronounced social comparisons are, the stronger the negative externality becomes. Thereby, social comparisons eectively stien competition between rms and increase equilibrium wages. Note, that this result is independent of the rm specic productivities φ H and φ L . While rm productivities aect equilibrium wages, the eect of social comparisons of wages is not mediated by the distribution of productivities.
4 A proof of stability of the Nash equilibrium is provided in the Appendix.
Wage distribution
Social comparisons also have an eect on the wage distribution.
Proposition 2. A higher prevalence of social comparisons decreases the relative wage dierential.
Proof. Using our previous results we get for the relative wage dierential
The partial derivative is
To provide an intuition, remember how each rm sets the wage, cf. (12).
It takes as given the wages of the two neighboring rms with which it competes for labor and raises its own wage as long as the net revenue less the wage of the additional worker is larger than the loss from having to pay all workers a higher wage. The fact that all rms take as given the wage of the neighboring rms when optimizing explains why γ does not enter the absolute wage dierential. Since job characteristics are distributed uniformly, changes in the disutility from accepting a job with more disadvantageous features reduce the gain from accepting any job by the same amount. This implies that an increase in wages paid by low and high productivity rms by the same amount owing to more pronounced social comparisons results in a smaller proportional increase of the (high) wage paid by the high productivity rm. Accordingly, the relative wage dierential w * H /w * L declines with the strength of social comparisons.
Employment and output
Social comparisons change the composition of employment between high and low productivity rms and, therefore, alter aggregate output.
Proposition 3. A higher prevalence of social comparisons shifts employment from low to high productivity rms, thereby increasing total output in the economy.
Proof. Inserting equilibrium wages w * H and w * L into (6) gives
and
As φ H > φ L we get that ∂L *
, owing to an increase in the parameter γ, taking into account that k * i (p i , r) is independent of γ, is given by:
To establish the increase in aggregate output, utilizing ∂L * H /∂γ > 0, we
From the rst-order condition (9) we know
Labor supply is a positive function of the dierence between the wage paid in the rm under consideration and the average wage in neighboring rms. For high productivity rms this average equals the wage paid by 5 In the Appendix we derive the condition for L * L > 0.
low productivity rms, and vice versa. In addition, more pronounced social comparisons amplify the eects of the absolute wage dierential on labor supply. In consequence, if individuals compare the wages paid by rms more intensively, labor supply to rms paying higher wages will go up, whereas labor supply to low wage rms will decline. Since H-type rms use the (marginal) unit of labor input more productively, shifting labor to H-type rms increases aggregate output.
Functional income distribution
Social comparisons also have an eect on the functional income distribution.
Proposition 4. A higher prevalence of social comparisons increases the total wage bill and reduces prots of both types of rms and, consequently, in aggregate.
Proof. Let us write the wage bill for two neighboring rms as
Since there are n/2 such rm pairs, the total wage bill W is:
As we have already shown that (a) the absolute wages dierential does not change with more pronounced social comparisons, (b) all wages increase, and (c) employment at high productivity rms goes up, the wage bill rises.
Inserting wages and employment levels into the prot equations, we can calculate maximal prots as:
We know that wages of low-productivity rms increase with γ and employment at low-productivity rms decreases with γ. This implies that prots of low-productivity rms shrink if social comparisons become more pronounced (∂π L /∂γ < 0). Since, moreover, ∂π * L /∂γ = ∂π * H /∂γ, prots in both types of rms and in aggregate decline.
6
In the present setting, total wage payments unambiguously increase for two reasons: First, total employment is constant. Thus, a shift in employment towards high-productivity, high-wage rms increases wage payments of all workers who change rms. Second, wages of workers in high-and in low-productivity rms go up. Consequently, also wage payments to those workers rise who stay in the same rm. The prot eect can be explained as follows: Social comparisons incentivize rms of both types to pay higher wages. This squeezes their prots per worker employed. Moreover, more intense social comparisons shift labor supply towards the high-productivity rms, at the expense of the low-productivity rms. As a consequence, the low-productivity rms employ fewer workers and each worker generates less revenues. Although the high productivity rms gain in terms of attracting a larger share of the labor force, it does not compensate for the lower net revenue less the wage of a worker. Aggregate prots decline.
Welfare
In the absence of social comparisons welfare will be maximized by an allocation of workers across rms such that the increase in output by having one additional worker in a high-productivity instead of a low-productivity 6 In the Appendix we provide the condition for positive prots.
rm balances the rise in the dis-utility from working at less advantageous conditions. This allocation will not result as market outcome because rms compare the changes in output and wages. Given identical wage payments to all workers within a rm, the rm's marginal costs of attracting an additional worker are higher than the social costs, as measured by the dis-utility incurred by workers. Since high-productivity rms pay higher wages, the distortion is more pronounced for such rms and the market equilibrium in the absence of social comparisons is characterized by too little employment in high-productivity rms.
To ascertain the welfare consequences of social comparisons, we dene welfare as the sum of rms' prots and wage payments net of dis-utility costs. In our derivation and interpretation, we focus on the indirect eects of a higher prevalence of social comparisons. These repercussions via a reallocation of labor across the dierent types of rms represent the economically relevant adjustments. More intensive social comparisons also have a direct impact on welfare, simply because the aggregate utility from social comparisons changes. The welfare eect of social comparisons can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 5. A higher prevalence of social comparisons increases welfare.
Proof. Dene W F as the sum of prots of all rms and wage payments net of dis-utility costs of all workers
with
for i = L, H. From the denition of utility and prots it is immediately obvious that welfare W F is unaected by the level of wage payments. Simplifying welfare accordingly and formulating the eects of social comparisons and dis-utility explicitly, yields:
Collecting terms and inserting equilibrium wages w * H , w * L in accordance with (13) and (14), welfare can be expressed as:
2 )
The derivative of welfare with respect to γ is given by:
We know that the direct welfare eect of an increase in γ ,
∂W F ∂γ
, is positive since φ H > φ L and employment in H-type rms exceeds employment in Ltype rms. Making use of
, and collecting common terms, the overall welfare change is found to be:
Substituting for employment levels in accordance with (18) and (19) it can be noted that the increase in revenues dominates the rise in dis-utility.
Since greater prevalence of social comparisons reduces prots, welfare can only increase if the utility gains of the workers more than compensate the losses of the rms. First of all, more social comparisons increase wages of all workers and, moreover, employment shifts to the better paying rms.
However, workers also incur greater dis-utility from working at rms with less advantageous characteristics and may suer from greater losses due to other rms paying higher wages than the rm at which they are employed.
In total, however, workers are better o and, additionally, no worker is worse o. Intuitively, this is the case, because all wages rise by the same amount.
Therefore, the utility from social comparisons will remain constant for all workers who do not change rms, for a given intensity of social comparisons, that is, ignoring the direct impact of more intensive comparisons. Moreover, higher wages make all workers better o. In consequence, all workers who remain with their employer experience higher utility due to wage adjustments. Now, consider workers who change rms. They will only do so if the increase in wages more than compensates the rise in dis-utility due to having to work at a less favorable location. Accordingly, the workers who move to high-productivity rms owing to a greater prevalence of social comparisons are also better o. Comparing the workers' gains with the rms' losses it can be noted that the welfare consequences of wage changes are zero because the fall in prots is balanced by the increase in workers' income. However, rms will only employ additional workers if the increase in output is larger than the additional wage costs. Therefore, prots fall by less than wages increase and the net eect of more intensive social comparisons is positive because of the reallocation of labor to high-productivity rms.
Conclusions
We analyzed the consequences of social preferences for labor market outcomes in oligopsony. It turns out that status seeking behavior of workers has important implications for wages, the wage distribution, the structure of employment, output, welfare, as well as the functional income distribution in an imperfectly competitive market setting. Interestingly, social comparisons among workers reduce the market power of rms, compensating for the expropriation of workers typically arising in monopsony and oligopsony.
We nd that wages paid both in high-and in low-productivity rms increase. Furthermore, we can show that the ratio of wages of high-and low-productivity rms fall. Employment shifts towards the high productivity rms and, therefore, total output and the wage sum become larger, whereas total prots decline. Our calculations clarify that the workers' in-crease in utility more than compensates the decline in rms' prots so that welfare dened as the sum of prots and aggregate utility increases with social comparisons.
Our results, we believe, have important implications for empirical work on estimating the labor supply curve facing a rm (see Manning, 2003, ch. 4) . To the extent that social comparisons matter and atten out the inverse labor supply curves to individual rms in non-competitive settings, estimates may suer from an omitted variables bias. If it is not taken into account that workers compare their own wages to wages paid at other rms, rm specic labor supply elasticities may understate the actual degree of labor market frictions. It should be interesting to include measures of social comparisons which are becoming more and more available in household survey data into estimates of labor supply elasticities facing a rm.
Policy implications of our analysis are dierent from the ones of other contributions on social comparisons where tax policy implications are scrutinized (see references in the Introduction). We conjecture that taxing individuals in accordance with the strength of social comparisons could actually be welfare-reducing in our setting. This would be the case because social comparisons can never fully eradicate the distortion due to market power of (protable) rms. Hence, our contribution suggests that market interventions via taxation in order to internalize externalities due to social comparisons need to be viewed more carefully against the background of labor market imperfections.
Appendix
Alternative specications for social comparisons
Labor supply with inequity aversion
Assume that workers are inequity averse as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . In this case, a worker compares the utility when working for rm i or rm i + according to
The worker i derives dis-utility if he earns more than workers at the other rm, and also derives dis-utility if he earns less than the workers at the other rm i + . This is in essence inequity aversion. The same reasoning applies if the worker would be employed at rm i + . Arising dis-utility is weighted with γ h , γ l > 0. For deriving labor supply, we have to distinguish two cases:
• For Case 1 with w i > w i + we get from (34):
• For Case 2 with w i < w i + we get:
It turns out that the condition which denes a situation in which it is benecial for the worker to work in rm i is the same for Cases 1 and 2. Solving for x gives:
If γ l > γ h , i.e. if earning less than the comparison group reduces utility by more than earning more, social comparisons counteract the eect of the dis-utility arising from t, as it is the case in (4).
Labor supply with encompassing asymmetric social comparisons Alternatively, consider the following very general utility function for a worker placed between rms i and i + and working in rm i
and the utility of the same worker placed between rms i and i + would he
This specication assumes that the worker derives (dis-) utility from the comparison of wages in the two rms where he can decide to work. The strength of this comparison eect is indicated by the parameter α 1 , α 1 > 0. Moreover, the utility function captures the idea that the intensity of comparisons, as described by the parameters α 2 and α 3 , α 2 , α 3 > 0, may vary across reference groups. For simplicity, we have limited their number to two and denoted the respective reference wages, which are exogenous from the worker's perspective by w 1 and w 2 . These reference wages may, for example, refer to dierent groups of workers or rms with respect to income or distance on the circle, such that w 1 (w 2 ) is the average wage paid in low (high) productivity rms. Additionally, the reference wages could be given by employment or distance weighted averages, for example, because workers situated closer to the worker under consideration aect the reference wage more strongly than those situated further away. Finally, the parameter 1 − α allows for the possibility that stronger social comparisons reduce the relevance of the own wage. One way to model such an eect would be to
Given such preferences, a worker will rather work for rm i if
Again social comparisons, that is, an increase in α 1 , α 2 , or α 3 or a concomitant rise in α by the same amount, counteract the eect of the disutility arising from t, as it is the case in (4).
Stability of Nash equilibrium
The Jacobian matrix of the Nash game for n = 2 writes 
Both matrices are circular and symmetric. Eigenvalues of such a matrix follow from
where j(r) with r = 1, ..., n are the elements of the rst row of the matrix J, and l = 0, ..., n − 1 is the index for the eigenvalues (c.f. Montaldi, 2012) .
For n = 2 we have one nonzero entry j(r) = 1/2 in each row of J, and for n ≥ 4 we have two nonzero entries j(r) = 1/4 in each row of J. As for circular and symmetric matrices one has b(l) = 0 for all l, it follows α(l) = a(l). As, moreover, −1 ≤ cos(x) ≤ 1 all eigenvalues will lie in the
i.e. within the unit circle, which proves stability of the Nash equilibrium.
Condition on positive prots
From the proof of Proposition 4 we already know that prots of higher productivity rms will surely be positive if prots of low productivity rms are non-negative and that
. Since the right-hand side of the inequality is decreasing in the number of rms n,
Condition on utility larger than reservation wages Utility of workers is, see (1),
From the utility function of a worker it is obvious that a high wage worker always has a higher utility than a low wage worker, for a given dis-utility from disadvantageous job characteristics. Therefore, a sucient condition for all workers wanting to work is that a low wage worker living away at maximum distance from a low productivity rm has utility
Simplifying and inserting wages gives
Rearranging yields
The condition on positive prots for rms, as derived about, is φ H − φ L < 3t n(1 + γ 
As long as φ H is not too much larger than φ L , a γ exists such that all workers will want to work and rms make positive prots.
Positive employment
Employment was derived as
As by assumption φ H > φ L , employment at all rms will be positive if φ H − φ L < 3t n 1 + γ n n−1 (56) which is equivalent to π L > 0.
No capturing of neighbor's market
So far derivations of equilibrium wages etc. have been based on the assumption that a rm i employs workers situated between rms i and i + , and i and i − , respectively. Theoretically, rm i could attempt to raise its prots above the levels dened in equation (26) by also employing workers situated, for example, between rm i + and the next rm on the circle. Here we derive a sucient condition for a rm to be unwilling to oer a wage such that it captures the neighboring rm's labor. In order to do so and without loss of generality we may consider 3 rms. Firms 1 and 3 are H-type rms, rm 2 is an L-type rm. The order on the circle is 1, 2, 3. First, we want to know under which condition it is more attractive for a worker who is indierent between working in rms 2 or 3 to work in rm 1. Second, we show that a wage which fullls this condition may result in negative prots and will, hence, not be oered by rm 1.
Suppose this marginal worker is located at distance η from rm 2, such that the costs of traveling to rm 1 are t/n + tη. Further assume that if the worker moves to rm 1 because he is oered a wage suciently high, the worker knows that all workers in rm 2 will do the same thing. This would be the case because all other workers are located closer to rm 1. Therefore, rm 2 would cease to exist. Consequently, the number of rms would go down by one and the comparison wage would only include n/2 − 1 H-type and L-type rms (instead of n/2 H-type rms and n/2 − 1 L-type rms when working in rm 2). The indierent worker would rather work for rm 1 if that rm oered a wage w cap that fullls
where the left hand side of the inequality is the utility accruing to the worker if he worked for rm 1 that would pay a wage w cap , and the right hand side is the utility of that same worker if he continued to work at the L-type rm.
Rearranging gives w cap (1 + γ) − t n > w * L
(1 + γ)2(n − 1) + γ 2(n − 1) + w * H −γ 2(n − 1) (58) and after inserting equilibrium wages (13), (14) we get w cap > 1 3 φ H 2(n − 1) + γ(2n − 3) 2(n − 1)(1 + γ) + 1 3 φ L 4(n − 1) + γ(4n − 3) 2(n − 1)(1 + γ)
+ t n γ (1 + γ)(n − 1)(1 + γ n n−1 ) .
For the rm 1 to make positive prots when deviating it needs to be the case that φ H > w cap , so that we may write φ H > 1 3 φ H 2(n − 1) + γ(2n − 3) 2(n − 1)(1 + γ) + 1 3 φ L 4(n − 1) + γ(4n − 3) 2(n − 1)(1 + γ) Condition (61) implies that as long as γ > 0 we can nd a parametrization for which rm H does not have an incentive to pay a higher wage than in equilibrium because prots would turn negative. For this parametrization also the L-type rm will not want to oer a wage to capture the neighboring market given that it has lower productivity than the H-type rm.
